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Reik, Not To Be Confused With . . . 
 
Ever since I started researching the life and works of Theodor Reik, I have 
rarely been able to talk about my project to fellow scholars, academic 
colleagues and intellectual friends without having to correct basic 
misunderstandings and justify the relevance of my object (and subject) of 
study. The most common misperception I have encountered in conversations 
with people on both sides of the Atlantic is nothing less than a case of 
mistaken identity, whereby my interlocutors would often express a genuine 
interest in my work, to the point of providing detailed comments on some of 
my interpretations, until they find out that Reik was not the discoverer of 
orgone, did not invent the cloudbuster, had not been thrown into jail by the 
Food and Drug Administration and (slightly more embarrassingly) was never 
associated with a popular Japanese technique for stress reduction. For some 
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time I believed that the confusion probably stemmed from my own ambiguous 
pronunciation of the name, or even from my persistent failure to mention both 
first name and surname, yet I gradually observed that it reflected a key aspect 
of my interlocutors‟ public and cultural awareness. Reik is constantly at risk of 
being confused with Reich (and occasionally with Reiki), yet Reich is almost 
never mistaken for Reik. Much more than his namesake, Reich somehow 
succeeded in leaving an indelible mark on Western cultural history, despite 
being a less prolific writer, a more idiosyncratic thinker and a less regular 
contributor to the popular press. In addition, it would seem that the current 
confusion between the two men has its own history, dating back to a period in 
time when they were both still alive, so that it should not be judged merely in 
terms of the unequal legacy of their work. Reviewing Listening with the Third 
Ear (Reik, 1948) in The New York Times shortly after it was released, 
Anthony Bower (1948) pointed out that Theodore (sic) Reik “was a favorite 
pupil and is still a devoted disciple of Freud” and is “not to be confused with 
Wilhelm Reich” (p. BR6). In an interview with Bluma Swerdloff conducted on 
June 7, 1965, Reik himself disclosed that already during the late 1920s, when 
he taught and practiced in Berlin, he was often confused with Wilhelm Reich 
(Reik, 1966). Given the fact that Reich was nine years younger than Reik and 
had by that time only published two books (Reich, 1925, 1927), whereas 
Reik‟s output was already gigantic and his name had made the headlines in 
various parts of the world owing to a widely publicised court-case and the 
ensuing discussion on “lay-analysis” (Freud, 1926/1959; Leupold-Löwenthal, 
1990; Heenen-Wolff, 1990), the original confusion between the two men may 
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have been largely circumstantial, but it nonetheless set the tone for future 
mis-identifications. 
Why did Bower feel the need to tell his readership about the identity of 
the author whose book he was reviewing, without providing any details about 
the person with whom he could possibly be confused? Why does the majority 
of my interlocutors, regardless of their cultural habitat, remember Wilhelm 
Reich and his achievements, yet fail to produce even the slightest detail about 
the life and works of Theodor Reik? For many years, I refused to engage with 
this question, preferring instead to reiterate my reasons for believing in Reik‟s 
lasting significance, and for believing why to ignore him constitutes a major 
flaw in one‟s cultural memory. First, I would argue, Theodor Reik was one of 
Freud‟s most beloved pupils, in whom he recognized a brilliant scholar and an 
extraordinarily versatile creative spirit. Freud explicitly advised him to pursue a 
career as a researcher, and supported him morally, intellectually, financially 
and politically like no other of his collaborators. Second, Reik‟s name is 
inextricably linked to the social and institutional debates on the acceptability of 
lay-analysis that divided the psychoanalytic community throughout most of the 
twentieth century. As the founder, in 1948, of the National Psychological 
Association for Psychoanalysis (NPAP) he enabled numerous people who 
had been rejected as trainees by the International Psycho-Analytic 
Association (IPA), on account of their not having a medical degree, to start 
their clinical training in psychoanalysis. Third, despite his unfailing loyalty to 
Freud, Reik did not hesitate to take issue with many of his mentor‟s ideas, 
thus developing innovative perspectives on psychoanalytic technique, the 
history of the Jewish people, the mental economy of masochism, and entering 
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intellectual territories the founder had only briefly touched upon or had never 
even approached, such as music, artistic creation and (perhaps most 
importantly) the unconscious of the analyst. 
In presenting these three justifications (others could no doubt be 
added) for (re-)examining the part played by Reik within and outside the 
psychoanalytic movement, I have generally echoed opinions formulated by 
historians of psychoanalysis such as Roazen (1975/1992), Bergmann and 
Hartman (1976/1990), Ahren and Melchers (1985) and Hale (1995), including 
some details found in a small handful of biographical sketches, such as those 
by Gustin (1953), Natterson (1966/1995), Freeman (1971), Alby (1985), 
Mühlleitner (1992) and Reppen (2002a, 2002b), and drawing on the sparkling 
insights of the utterly devoted Reik-scholar that is Murray H. Sherman (1965, 
1970-71, 1974, 1981-82). I still believe that the aforementioned reasons may 
legitimize any research project on Reik, yet I am also more convinced that 
together they will not constitute a sufficiently solid ground for ensuring his 
intellectual survival outside the psychoanalytic community, and perhaps not 
even within its professional confines. In fact, the aforementioned reasons 
were already largely acknowledged during Reik‟s lifetime, when the Anglo-
American climate was much more favourably disposed towards 
psychoanalysis, and they clearly failed to leave an impression then, since his 
memory seems barely alive today, even amongst the educated public. 
For this paper, I have decided not to make an attempt at tackling the 
contemporary state of cultural and professional neglect in which Reik‟s 
contributions have fallen, whether by revisiting and re-enforcing the 
hackneyed reasons for his importance, or by formulating supplementary 
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motives for rehabilitating his work. At best, my decision may appear as 
fatalistic; at worst, it will probably be perceived as evidence that even Reik-
scholars no longer believe in the possibility of rescuing their subject from the 
archives of oblivion. The truth is, however, that it takes more than an 
academic publication to modify the mnemic landscape of Western intellectual 
culture. Putting Reik back on the map, carving out a new niche for his works 
in the twenty-first century, is not what can and should be done in the pages of 
a scholarly article, however wide its distribution and however many people are 
expected to read it. Taking this idea to heart, I have therefore decided to 
adopt a different, and perhaps much more challenging approach, by re-
activating the questions that I have deliberately avoided for such a long time. 
Why does Reik not live on in Western culture? Why does he no longer 
exercise the type of influence (and fascination) that other figures in the history 
of psychoanalysis, who were less famous and less prolific during their 
lifetimes, such as Melanie Klein, Wilfred R. Bion, Jacques Lacan and, indeed, 
Wilhelm Reich, still very much and even increasingly enjoy? Why is there no 
such thing as Reikian psychoanalysis? 
 
 
Six suppositions and their refutation 
 
In order to formulate a plausible answer to these questions, I shall engage in 
a reductio ad absurdum, charting six propositions and demonstrating that 
there is sufficient evidence to discard each of these statements as either 
nonsensical, inconsistent or impossible, from which I then anticipate a more 
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valid assertion to emerge. Here are the six propositions: 1. Whatever else he 
may have brought by way of cultural heritage and symbolic capital, Theodor 
Reik possessed neither the persona nor the charisma that could inspire 
people to carry the weight of his intellectual influence into the twenty-first 
century; 2. On the whole, Reik‟s style of exposition was too confessional and 
anecdotal for his works to constitute a sufficient theoretical basis for the 
development of a new (Reikian) psychoanalytic tradition; 3. Troubled by a 
pervasive (and largely unresolved) guilt-complex and a high degree of moral 
masochism, Reik did not seek to publicize his accomplishments, generally 
shunning the limelight and preferring to live the life of an intellectual hermit; 4. 
Unlike many other pupils of Freud, Reik was too loyal to his mentor to develop 
a new theory of psychoanalytic technique, and therefore missed out on the 
opportunity to establish a new psychoanalytic tradition; 5. Reik‟s theoretical 
and practical influence as a scholar and psychoanalyst never followed an 
ascending curve because of his recurrent rejection from the official 
psychoanalytic bodies; 6. Reik himself did not undertake sufficient institutional 
initiatives to guarantee the maintenance, dissemination and development of 
his ideas. 
As far as the first proposition is concerned, all of the public documents, 
private correspondence and personal memoirs about Reik that I have been 
able to consult over the years bear witness to the fact that his environment 
perceived him as an extraordinarily erudite, unusually engaging and strangely 
captivating man, whose discursive blend of brilliant observations, sharp 
witticisms and cynical one-liners managed to bemuse and inspire generations 
of listeners, the young as well as the old. Reflecting upon his first encounters 
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with Reik at a series of psychoanalytic seminars, Murray H. Sherman (1974) 
concedes that he “was inordinately difficult to approach in any personal way, 
despite the fact that there was a quality of immediate and penetrating intimacy 
to his being” (p. viii). This ostensible contradiction in the man‟s professional 
attitude, Sherman argues, actually reflected a more fundamental, dynamic co-
existence of seemingly incompatible lives. The life Reik wrote about with so 
much candour in his books was by no means the life he led with his wife and 
children, nor was it the life he showed to his colleagues and students. And if it 
was an account of his internal life, it only ever represented a series of 
carefully crafted fragments of his great public confession (Reik, 1949), behind 
which there was still a more secretive, private life that was not deemed 
suitable for publication. 
All of the people (former students, patients, trainees, supervisees and 
collaborators) I have interviewed over the years about their personal 
recollections of Reik confirmed that he was a multi-dimensional man, a 
complex character, impossible to pin down, or as Erika Freeman (1971) put it: 
“a simple man in a complicated way” (p. 5). Yet precisely for these reasons, 
he seems to have succeeded in attracting a great deal of interest, curiosity 
and fascination. The popular science writer Harold M. Green (1999) recalls 
that when he attended Adelphi University as an undergraduate in 1959, he 
met Theodor Reik at a graduate psychology colloquium and was instantly 
struck by his charismatic delivery—without notes but with a heavy Viennese 
accent—and his ability to cultivate a certain stage presence. The young man 
was so enthralled by the performance that he decided to visit the 
psychoanalyst in his Manhattan apartment, which subsequently led to an 
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exchange of letters, from which Green (s.d.) concluded that his correspondent 
was both “very modest” and that “he was a person of great warmth and 
sincerity, whose words of encouragement to the writer as a young student, 
are recalled with gratitude” (p. 1). In a contemplative memoir of his various 
encounters with Reik, Donald M. Kaplan (1968) even drew special attention to 
the enchanting qualities of his voice: “[I]t is high-pitched. It is also powerful . . . 
And his voice is almost lush with expressiveness, partly a Viennese trait, 
partly the result of an individually cultivated oratorical habit. His voice always 
wants to achieve something larger than conversation. Even his whispers have 
a timbre that  delivers more than mere intimacy” (p. 56). 
Both public and private reminiscences of Theodor Reik indicate that he 
possessed all the necessary attributes to warrant a huge, enthusiastic 
following: an unrivalled, yet lightly carried erudition, an imposing personal 
presence, a sparkling sense of humour, and an unfathomable, mysterious 
mindset. Combined with his psychoanalytic credentials—unreservedly 
supported by Freud (1938/1952), yet equally unreservedly refused by the 
official institutions—these attributes should have ensured if not the creation of 
Reikian psychoanalysis, at least the widespread survival of his personal and 
intellectual influence. Conversely, if his influence has waned over the past fifty 
years or so, this can hardly be explained with reference to Reik‟s lack of lustre 
as an intellectual and psychoanalyst. 
Perhaps the problem, then, lies with Reik‟s peculiar confessional style, 
which characterizes many of his works published during the 1950s and 60s. In 
his review of Listening with the Third Ear, Bower (1948) already pointed out 
that the book displays “a certain breeziness of manner” and that “some 
 9 
chapter headings [are] suggestive of Dale Carnegie rather than of anything 
more profound” (p. BR6). The comment was carefully airbrushed from the 
review when the publishers used it as a promotional blurb for the book‟s 
subsequent editions, yet Reik‟s roving (and some would no doubt say 
“rambling”) approach to his materials may very well have been a significant 
asset for ensuring public success. His books were often announced with great 
pump and circumstance in major newspapers and considered sufficiently 
solid, yet not too serious to be serialized, anthologized and digested. In his 
most popular books, such as Listening with the Third Ear (1948), Fragment of 
a Great Confession (1949), The Secret Self (1952) and The Haunting Melody 
(1953), Reik‟s style is decisively and deliberately non-linear. The author 
moves between self-disclosure, scholarly exposition and literary criticism, 
whereby the entire process is driven by an untameable drive towards 
introspection, which may at best be appreciated as authentic and at worst be 
condemned as infuriatingly self-indulgent. 
Murray H. Sherman (1970-71) has defined Reik‟s style as anecdotal, 
yet I would prefer to call it rhapsodic, partly because this term captures the 
meandering musicality of the events from which he so often took his own 
intellectual inspiration, partly because it renders the ecstatic and impassioned 
voice with which he presented his ideas. Reik‟s anecdotes, whether taken 
from his nostalgic recollections of Freud or from simple everyday happenings 
in his immediate environment (as a father, husband or psychoanalyst), are 
never an end in themselves, but always serve to illustrate personal 
experiences of wonder, astonishment and surprise. And if these experiences 
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crystallize in an aphorism or a psychoanalytic “bon mot”, it is not so much the 
product that counts, but the source that has generated it. 
In this sense, Reik was never a teacher in the conventional meaning of 
the word. Of course, he lectured extensively in Vienna, Berlin, The Hague, 
New York and various other places and (as I have indicated above) to great 
acclaim, but his lectures, which also formed the basis for some of his earlier 
works, such as Geständniszwang und Strafbedürfnis (Reik, 1925) and Dogma 
und Zwangsidee (Reik, 1927a), rarely contained a systematic exposition of 
knowledge. Although during his Austrian, German and Dutch periods Reik 
was in a sense more rigorous and “academic” than during his American years, 
his was nonetheless already an exuberant, floating mind, or as Robert Lindner 
(1953) described it: “[A] wide-roving intellect, unafraid, and denying that there 
are any limits to inquiry” (p. vii). This is presumably also the mind that Freud 
tried to appease during one of his meetings with Reik on the Ringstraße, 
when he famously told his pupil not to disperse his “intellectual energy on too 
many different subjects” (Reik, 1952, p. 3). 
Reik was a relentless soul-searcher rather than an expositor of ideas. 
Yet many people, including psychoanalytic practitioners, found this trait to be 
particularly appropriate as a point of entry into the subject matter of 
psychoanalysis. Reproducing Reik‟s confessional style, Martin Grotjahn 
(1968) expressed his indebtedness as follows: “The writings of Sigmund 
Freud introduced me to psychoanalysis. The works of Theodor Reik showed 
me how to be an analyst. Freud gave me knowledge, Reik gave me courage” 
(p. 27). So, if anything, the frankness with which Reik disclosed the workings 
of his own mind and their impact on the psychoanalytic treatment in a series 
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of scattered musings and reflections actually helped in the public 
dissemination and professional consolidation of his name as a worthy 
successor of Freud. The fact that Reik did not attempt to systematize 
psychoanalysis, as Fenichel (1945) had done in The Psychoanalytic Theory of 
Neurosis, but chose to rely instead on the circuitous path through his own 
mind may have made it more difficult for his readers to delineate a Reikian 
theory of psychoanalysis, but it also encouraged many of them to commend 
the author as a psychoanalyst working and writing in the true spirit of Freud. 
Could it be, then, that Reik‟s own unresolved guilt-complex and his 
moral masochism were responsible for the gradual erasure of his name from 
Western cultural memory? Could it be that Reik himself was unconsciously 
displeased with his (minor) celebrity status, and actively refused to see his 
name being associated with a new psychoanalytic tradition? Could it be, even, 
that his regular confusion with Reich satisfied his unconscious desire to be 
marginalized, ignored and humbled? In the opening chapter of his Fragment 
of a Great Confession (1949) Reik situated the origin of his own guilt-complex 
in the circumstances surrounding the death of his father. On the evening of 
June 16, 1906, the seriously ailing Max Reik was being attended by two 
medical doctors, who ordered the youngest son of the family to run to the 
nearest pharmacy in order to obtain campher for a potentially life-saving 
injection. Theodor ran as quickly as his legs would take him, yet when he 
arrived back at the family home his father had already passed away, which 
elicited the guilt-ridden question: “Could I have saved father‟s life if I had run 
more quickly?” (p. 12). During the following weeks, the eighteen-year-old Reik 
was tormented by self-reproaches, repentance and a need for punishment, 
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yet instead of procrastinating and sacrificing his career-prospects he 
immersed himself with unstoppable zeal into the works of Goethe, reading all 
of the 133 volumes of the so-called Sophien-edition of the complete works—
and then some (p. 17). One does not need to be a psychoanalyst to surmise 
that when Reik met Freud a couple of years later the bond between the two 
men must have quickly acquired the characteristics of a father-son 
relationship. In Fragment of a Great Confession (1949) Reik himself 
confessed that at the time of Freud‟s death, “the admired man . . . had 
become a father substitute” (p. 15). Yet in his relationship with this “admired 
man”, Reik was also presented with an opportunity to satisfy his need for 
punishment. As he put it in the introduction to the publication of his selected 
correspondence with Freud: “I considered it inappropriate to omit Freud‟s 
critical comments on my own shortcomings and weaknesses. Whenever he 
had to make critical remarks, he did it with such obvious benevolence and in 
such a form that he almost never hurt my feelings” (Reik, 1956/1974, p. 629-
630). Unsurprisingly, perhaps, when Freud died in 1939, Reik reacted to it in 
the same way as to the death of his father. Having been unable to complete 
his lengthy study of masochism (Reik, 1940/1941) before Freud‟s death, he 
once again felt that he had failed to realize the great hopes and expectations 
with which he had been invested (Reik, 1949, p. 15). 
In light of Reik‟s personal drama, which he himself placed under the 
aegis of an obsessional neurosis (Reik, 1949, p. 13), it would be easy to 
regard all his major works as symptomatic continuations of an unresolved 
guilt-complex. Their pervasive themes of guilt, crime, ritual, (need for) 
punishment, compulsion to confess and masochism, which were almost 
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invariably presented in a shamelessly self-centred style, and released into the 
world as a relentless series of thought processes, may already indicate that 
through his writings Reik simply repeated the same devastating unconscious 
conflict that had fundamentally altered his life when he was eighteen years 
old. Yet instead of compensating for the harrowing self-reproaches by 
devoting himself frantically to reading, it would seem that he subsequently 
addressed the lingering feelings of guilt by devoting himself with an almost 
superhuman industriousness to writing about the very themes that had 
prompted his zeal in the first place. 
Would it be too far-fetched, then, to argue that Theodor Reik himself 
could have secretly contributed, in an act of unconscious self-sabotage, to the 
gradual erasure of his intellectual legacy? The idea is definitely an attractive 
one, yet I nonetheless believe that it is too much based on a one-dimensional 
portrait of Reik‟s character. The persistent need for punishment represents 
only one side of Reik‟s pervasive guilt-complex, the other (and less often 
acknowledged) side being an equally persistent need to be loved. Late in life, 
Reik (1963) devoted an entire book to this topic, mainly consisting of 
epigrams and aphorisms, but his own need to be loved, which regularly 
translated itself into an ardent desire for recognition, often appeared in the 
margins of his confessional volumes, and can also be gauged from private 
correspondence. 
After dedicating his Fragments of a Great Confession (1949) to the 
memory of Sigmund Freud, Reik started his book with a remarkable quotation 
from Goethe: “We love only the individual; hence our enjoyment of all public 
self-expressions, confessions, memoirs, letters and anecdotes, even of 
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unimportant persons. The question whether one may write one‟s 
autobiography is most inappropriate. I consider him who does it the most 
courteous of all men. So long as one communicates one‟s life experiences, it 
matters not what motives propel him” (p. ix). One may argue that Reik was 
trying to justify his 500-page (fragment of a) confession to his readership, 
here, by presenting it with the seal of approval from a literary genius, yet in 
doing so he also demonstrated to himself that as a confessional writer he was 
insured with the love of his (and his father‟s) most beloved poet. 
Shortly after Reik arrived in the United States, he delivered a 
manuscript entitled “Better to have Loved and Lost” to Columbia University 
Press, offering the publishers letters of recommendation from Freud, Thomas 
Mann and Albert Einstein as endorsements of the value of his work, in order 
to persuade them to proceed with publication (Reik, 1941b). When Anna 
Freud visited New York in 1950 for a series of lectures, Reik wrote to her 
apologizing for the fact that he was unable to attend her presentation on 
account of his break with the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, yet at the 
same time asking her to spare fifteen minutes of her time for a private meeting 
(Reik, 1950). After Reik had shot to fame during the 1950s, his sixty-fifth and 
seventieth birthdays were celebrated in true Hollywood style, with 
announcements being sent to major newspapers and popular magazines 
such as The New Yorker, and numerous press cards being released for the 
scientific conference part of the programme (Nelson, 1958). 
Doubts could probably be raised as to whether these types of actions 
and events constitute good enough proof of Reik‟s need to be loved, yet they 
could hardly be regarded as the outpourings of a guilt-ridden character. 
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Already during his European years, but especially after his emigration to the 
US, Reik enjoyed a great deal of public success as a psychoanalyst, writer 
and lecturer, and there is no evidence that he did not enjoy it. If anything, he 
seemed keen to obtain, sustain and promote the recognition from colleagues, 
students and the public at large, so that the assertion that his gradual 
disappearance from the spotlight could be due to his own moral masochism 
and ongoing self-sabotage cannot really be upheld. 
The possibility that there is no such thing as Reikian psychoanalysis 
because Reik himself never developed his own psychoanalytic theory and 
technique may also be refuted. Reik felt that he was very much indebted to 
the intellectual, moral and financial support of Freud, and his loyalty to “the 
admired man” was probably greater than that of any other of Freud‟s pupils, 
yet his devotion and allegiance never turned him into a blind, uncritical 
acolyte. Although he would often find himself contemplating the portrait of 
Freud that hung above his desk, imagining the figure to come alive and 
extending his hand to his favourite pupil (Reik, 1940, p. vii), Reik was not too 
Freudian to be Reikian. He was never so mesmerized by the presence and 
memory of his substitute father that he was unable to develop his own ideas, 
in a critical engagement with those that had been advanced by the founder of 
psychoanalysis. For this reason, it does not make sense to argue that there is 
no such thing as Reikian psychoanalysis quite simply because it can be 
collapsed onto Freudian psychoanalysis—Reik‟s contributions being 
insufficiently detached from and therefore lacking in originality relative to the 
clinical framework and the technical recommendations that Freud himself 
articulated. 
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From his first tentative publications, on the love-life of the young 
Gustave Flaubert (Reik, 1911a, 1911b), Reik made a name for himself within 
the psychoanalytic community as the undisputed master of applied 
psychoanalysis. This reputation was no doubt galvanized when in 1918 the 
international psychoanalytic publishing house, headed by Freud, awarded him 
the first of a newly created series of annual prizes in applied psychoanalysis 
for his essay on “The Puberty Rites of Savages” (Reik, 1915-16/1931, 1940, 
p. 27; Freud, 1919/1955b, p. 269; Abraham & Freud, 1965, pp. 281-282; 
Wittenberger & Tögel, 1999, pp. 40-44). Yet apart from his many contributions 
to the psychoanalytic study of art, literature, religion, folkore and mythology, 
Reik also intermittently published short professional notes and more 
substantial academic papers on the clinical theory of psychoanalysis and 
related issues of psychoanalytic technique, such as the analysis of resistance 
(Reik, 1915/1924), the dynamics of affect (Reik, 1916) and the unconscious 
scope of forgetfulness (Reik, 1920). During the 1920s, his ideas on the 
psychoanalytic theory of technique slowly matured, initially leading to the 
publication of innovative studies on the meaning of silence (Reik, 1927b) and 
the significance of surprise (Reik, 1929), and finally crystallizing in a key 
paper at the twelfth international psychoanalytic congress of Wiesbaden in 
1932 (Reik, 1933), which Reik himself did not hesitate to announce as 
“programmatic” (p. 320). This 1932 paper constituted the bedrock for a 
weighty monograph entited Der Überraschte Psychologe (Reik, 1935), which 
was translated into English one year later (Reik, 1936), and which was 
eventually expanded into Listening with the Third Ear, the massive volume 
with which Reik shot to fame at the end of 1940s. 
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Although he would have felt hard-pressed to concede that he was no 
longer following the intellectual path cleared by Freud, Reik‟s ideas in these 
works were decidedly original, explicitly provocative and fundamentally non-
conformist. Arguing that the development of the psychoanalytic treatment can 
be conceived as a series of surprises on the side of the patient, Reik went on 
to claim that the analyst too must experience (the effect of) his interpretations 
as a surprise, because he is essentially compelled to operate with his own 
unconscious if he wants to reach out into the unconscious of his patients. Reik 
emphasized that there is no pre-determined route, no “royal road” through a 
patient‟s unconscious, which implies that the analyst can only direct the 
treatment by acknowledging what comes to him from his own unconscious 
knowledge. With characteristic zeal, Reik vehemently opposed the 
standardisation of analytic technique and the analyst‟s “pigeon-holing” of the 
patient on the basis of a pre-fabricated body of psychoanalytic knowledge. As 
he put it at the Wiesbaden congress: “[T]he analyst must approach the 
psychic material with a conscious openness of mind. I hold that this is a sine 
qua non of analytic research. Students of analysis cannot be too strongly 
warned against setting out to investigate the unconscious psychic processes 
with any definite ideas of what they will find, ideas probably derived from their 
conscious theoretical knowledge” (Reik, 1933, p. 327). To achieve this, Reik 
posited, the analyst must have both the courage to understand the voice of 
his unconscious and the courage not to understand whatever his conscious 
awareness of psychoanalytic theory may dictate (pp. 332-333). 
In this way, Reik dismissed technical rigidity without compromising on 
clinical rigour. Rallying against all types of analytic formalism, he distanced 
 18 
himself from the systematic, mechanised clinical procedures and the militant 
dismantling of the patient‟s resistances as advocated by Wilhelm Reich in his 
famous “character analysis” (Reich, 1928; 1933/1945), which he regarded as 
a view “inspired by an unjustifiable optimism about the extent and depth of our 
knowledge of the unconscious” (Reik, 1948, p. 442). Unsurprisingly, Reik‟s 
critique of standardized measures and general intellectualism within 
psychoanalysis earned him a reputation as the promoter of a subjective, 
introspective and conjectural practice, which opposes scientificity and verges 
on the creation of a pseudo-religious, mystical encounter between the analyst 
and the patient (Herold, 1939). Yet Reik himself did not want his analytic 
technique to be described as purely intuitive, given the term‟s connotations of 
arbitrariness, whimsicality and randomness. As such, he equally rejected the 
active technique based on the analyst‟s own free associations as introduced 
by Wilhelm Stekel (1938/1950), on account of it being uncritical, anti-
rationalist, illogical and virtually para-psychological. Whereas Reich had 
reduced logos to intelligence, Stekel had abdicated logos altogether (Reik, 
1948, pp. 448-449). 
Keen to underline his unwavering allegiance to Freud, Reik suggested 
that his position on technique was closer to that of his teacher than any of the 
other technical doctrines that had been formulated within the bosom of the 
psychoanalytic community, where scientificity, systematization and 
intellectualism held pride of place as the quintessential analytic values. 
Without discarding rationality and firmly convinced of the psychic power of 
thought and knowledge—on the side of the patient as well as on that of the 
analyst—Reik drew on Freud‟s famous precept that an analyst should always 
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approach a patient as if it is the first one he has ever treated (Freud, 
1912/1958a, p. 114; 1933/1964, pp. 173-175), in order to destabilize the 
analyst‟s belief in the value of her own conscious knowledge and its 
systematic application within the clinical setting, for the advancement of the 
psychoanalytic treatment. The most forceful formulation of this critique 
appeared again in Listening with the Third Ear (1948), which I shall take the 
liberty to quote at length: “My decided rejection of the conscious ordering, the 
consistent and systematic discipline, of the analytic process is most certainly 
not tantamount to a denial of any guiding principle. What I repudiate is the 
totalitarian claim of the new technique of dealing with resistance, the claim 
that the planning, rational factor is to be our guide in a psychical phase where 
it is out of place . . . There is an order governing the unconscious of the 
patient and the analyst; the analysis obeys the law by which it unfolds. But its 
order is determined by the reciprocal action of the unconscious . . . In contrast 
with the systematic and militant type of analysis that is recommended to us, I 
praise the exclusion on principle of order and compulsion in technique, the 
absence of a consistent system, the lack of all conscious and rigid 
arrangement. I confess myself an opponent of every kind of conscious 
mechanization of analytic technique. This establishment of order and plan that 
is to be forced upon us corresponds in the inner life to the efforts of so many 
domestics who do, indeed, tidy our writing tables and ruthlessly make an end 
of all disorder, but, by their consistent and systematic methods, sweep away 
or destroy, stupidly and senselessly, the fruits of years of laborious work” (p. 
448). 
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As I pointed out above, Reik‟s ideas on psychoanalytic technique were 
original as well as non-conformist. They were original, because despite 
Freud‟s intermittent scepticism about the clinical viability of the analyst‟s 
acquired knowledge he would never have gone so far as to say that 
psychoanalysis is a “duologue between one unconscious and another” (Reik, 
1933, p. 332). And he is also unlikely to have agreed with Reik‟s suggestion 
that in analyzing a patient the analyst must simultaneously be involved in a 
reciprocal process of self-analysis or, stronger still, that the analyst‟s self-
analysis during the treatment is a necessary precondition for it to progress in 
a psychoanalytically correct fashion. His ideas were strictly non-conformist, 
however, because they constituted a radical attack on one of the cardinal 
aims of the psychoanalytic movement during the 1930s and 40s, especially 
within the United States: to legitimize psychoanalysis as a scientific theory 
and practice by systematizing its theoretical knowledge-base and formalizing 
its clinical procedures. 
As a radical non-conformist, Reik must have known that he would 
always experience difficulty gaining acceptance from his peers, those 
occupying positions of authority, and the fanatics appointed to safeguard the 
purity of psychoanalytic doctrine. Yet this institutional atopia (and the 
compelling set of ideas on which it was based), rather than condemning him 
by definition to the psychoanalytic margins, could have put him into the best 
possible position for becoming the initiator of a new tradition. It is precisely on 
account of a similar dissatisfaction with the mechanization of technique within 
the psychoanalytic establishment that, during the early 1950s, Jacques Lacan 
started to develop his alternative theory of clinical practice, thereby borrowing 
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heavily from Reik‟s critique in Listening with the Third Ear, which in his case 
proved extremely fruitful for the emergence and dissemination of a new 
psychoanalytic tradition (Lacan 1966/2002; Miller, 1976; Nobus, 2000). 
Hence, whereas it is simply untrue to say that Reik did not develop a 
psychoanalytic theory of his own, it seems equally untenable to propose that 
his work did not give rise to a Reikian psychoanalytic tradition because he 
failed to secure the support of the psychoanalytic establishment. It is true that 
Reik was neither particularly welcomed in the Netherlands during the early 
1930s (Brecht, Friedrich, Hermanns, Kaminer, & Juelich, 1986, p. 65), nor in 
the United States in 1938 (Alexander, Eisenstein, & Grotjahn, 1966/1995, p. 
259)—a lack of hospitality which has traditionally been attributed to his not 
having a medical degree, but which may very well have been exacerbated by 
his analytic non-conformism—but we should not overestimate the disastrous 
effects of this exclusion and marginalisation on Reik‟s ability to foster his own 
psychoanalytic tradition, especially in light of his amazing capacity for 
defiance in the wake of adversity. 
All of this leaves one final explanation, in my reductio ad absurdum, as 
to why Reikian psychoanalysis never materialized: Reik himself did not 
undertake sufficient (or sufficiently viable) institutional initiatives to guarantee 
the future of his name as the founder of a psychoanalytic tradition. In this 
case, the absurdity  of the proposition is probably easier to prove than in any 
of the other cases, because it can be demonstrated on the basis of simple 
and unambiguous historical facts, rather than complicated interpretive 
arguments. After having been refused full membership by the New York 
Psychoanalytic Society and Institute in 1938, Reik remained undeterred and 
 22 
slowly started to gather a small group of people around him for weekly 
seminars and case-conferences, much like Lacan did during the early 1950s. 
Primarily composed of non-medical psychotherapists and health care 
professionals with an interest in psychoanalysis, this group at one point 
decided to create an official association and training centre for people without 
a medical degree—although without therefore excluding those who were in 
the possession of one—wishing to follow a vocational training programme in 
psychoanalysis. In 1948, this initiative led to the creation of the National 
Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (NPAP), which offered both 
theoretical and clinical training to candidates with a wide variety of (non-
medical) backgrounds (Schwaetzer-Barinbaum, 1953). In 1954, the NPAP, 
presided by Reik, decided to expand its services by opening a “Mental 
Hygiene Clinic” on a “nominal fee and free care basis” for impecunious 
citizens and analytic candidates of restricted financial means (Theodor Reik 
Mental Hygiene Clinic, 1954). When the clinic finally opened in 1960 under 
Reik‟s directorship, he explained at a press conference that he had been 
motivated “by one of Freud‟s predictions that one day there would be clinics 
available to those who could not afford costly treatment” (Harrison, 1960), by 
which he must have had in mind Freud‟s projected development of large-scale 
“free clinics”, at the fifth International Psychoanalytic Congress of Budapest in 
1918 (Freud, 1919/1955a; Danto, 2005). 
Although much like any other psychoanalytic group, the NPAP 
experienced a number of internal rifts, eventually leading to the dissension of 
some of its members and the creation of two new organisations (Reed, 
1990)—the Institute for Psychoanalytic Training and Research (IPTAR), 
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founded in 1958 and a component society if the IPA since 1991, and the New 
York Freudian Society, founded in 1959 and an IPA component society since 
1993—the NPAP continues to operate to the present day in its original spirit of 
openness and diversity, with the proviso that candidates need to be in the 
possession of at least a Master‟s degree in an academic area of human 
relations. What was originally referred to as the “Theodor Reik Clinic” is now 
called the “Theodor Reik Clinical Center for Psychotherapy” (TRCC), and it is 
one of the two referral services currently in place at the NPAP, with sliding 
scale fees starting at $25 per session (and $20 for eligible full time students). 
From 1950, when the NPAP obtained legal status as a training institute 
under the laws of the State of New York, until his death in 1969, Reik served 
as President and Honorary President of the organisation he had inspired, 
stimulating members and trainees with his intellectual presence, and 
supporting its various activities, not in the least the publication of “The 
Psychoanalytic Review”, the oldest psychoanalytic journal in English, which 
the NPAP had succeeded in acquiring in 1958 from the Smith Ely Jelliffe 
Trust. At the same time, he continued to write more prolifically than ever 
before, his name regularly appeared in the national newspapers, and his 
“confessional” books on literature, love, myth, religion and Jewish history were 
generally well-received by psychoanalytic and non-professional audiences 
alike. With a low-cost treatment centre carrying his name, a successful 
professional organisation created by virtue of his personal and intellectual 
influence, a public persona as a major psychoanalytic scholar, teacher and 
practitioner, and a steady number of loyal followers, Reik seemed to have 
possessed everything necessary to establish a new psychoanalytic tradition. 
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Much like Lacan in Paris during the 1950s and 60s, Reik was regarded by 
most of his American students as a spiritual guide, and many would have 
gone out of their way to honour his name, promote his ideas, expand his 
influence and ensure the preservation of his life, work and legacy in every 
possible way. So why is there no such thing as Reikian psychoanalysis? 
 
 
Intellectual and Institutional Independence 
 
The answer to the question that has been haunting this paper for too long now 
lies, I believe, in an irreducible feature of Reik‟s personal and professional 
outlook on psychoanalysis. When he argued during the 1930s and 40s that a 
psychoanalyst should have the courage not to listen to the voice of conscious 
reasoning, lending himself instead to the surprising acknowledgement of what 
he discovers in his own unconscious, Reik knew full well that this type of 
centripetal, reflexive process of intimate self-exploration could never be taught 
via any kind of formal-academic transmission of knowledge, but required a 
lengthy and ongoing journey of personal experience. In other words, he 
realized that the necessary precondition for someone becoming a 
psychoanalyst could not be fulfilled by means of the candidate learning the 
tricks of the trade from a knowledgeable teacher, but could only be satisfied in 
the closest possible association with oneself, via one‟s personal experience of 
psychoanalysis, but also (and perhaps more significantly) via one‟s constant 
self-analysis. As he put it in From Thirty Years with Freud: “[B]y instruction 
and demonstration through books, courses, and seminars, only the 
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technicalities of the psychoanalytic profession can be learned. The most 
important aspects of technique must be experienced. This communicable 
material is indispensable and basic to the analyst. But that material which 
must be acquired by experience is decisive for the effective practice of his 
profession” (Reik, 1940, p. 48). 
If readers may recognize, here, some of the reasons given by Freud in 
“On Beginning the Treatment” (1913/1958b) for restricting his “technical 
recommendations” to what takes place at the start of the analytic treatment, 
Reik pointed out that on the question of “the education of the analyst” his 
opinions were quite different from Freud‟s: “He found my views too exacting 
and had more respect than I for the value of instruction. He admitted, 
however, that the personal inclinations and talent of the individual were more 
important than is generally conceded . . .I replied that all instruction and 
control analysis was in vain if it were offered to individuals who had no innate 
gift and did not possess that „psychic sensitivity‟ he had once spoken of” 
(Reik, 1940, p. 59). It goes without saying that Reik did not doubt that he 
himself possessed this “psychic sensitivity”, in which he would probably have 
been supported by Freud, yet he was not at all convinced that the quality was 
very widespread. Concluding the account of his discussions with Freud 
concerning the “education of the analyst”, Reik wrote: “We finally agreed that 
the ideal would be for those who were born psychologists to learn the analytic 
method and be able to practice it. We have said we have to seek out such 
„born psychologists‟ not only in the circle of psychiatrists and neurologists. In 
my opinion they will be as few and far between there as anywhere else” (Reik, 
1940, p. 59). 
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Former and current members of the NPAP might be reluctant to admit 
it, but there is a good chance that Reik was disappointed about the lack of 
„born psychologists‟ in his own circle, partly because there is no reason to 
believe that the NPAP had a better strategy for identifying and recruiting them 
than other professional organisations, partly because the organisation itself 
tended to put a high emphasis on formal training at the expense of “personal 
experience”. And whereas Reik pursued his endless journey of self-discovery, 
publishing the results in an ever more rapid succession of “confessional” 
volumes, his students and colleagues rarely if ever attempted to do the same, 
preferring instead the more anonymous discourse that is characteristic of 
scholarly, academic papers. If we take into account the fact that at the end of 
Listening with the Third Ear Reik designated the fundamental analytic quality 
of being able to acknowledge the voice of one‟s own unconscious as „moral 
courage‟ (Reik, 1948, p. 493), he may even have felt from time to time that his 
own pupils lacked the necessary fibre to engage in psychoanalytic practice, 
especially if „moral courage‟ is measured by the extent to which they were 
willing and able to probe their own souls and share the results with the 
general public. I can only speculate, here, about Reik‟s perception of his own 
organisation and its members, and none of the people who worked under 
Reik ever disclosed feelings to me of having been disowned and abandoned 
by their spiritual leader, yet in comparing Reik‟s own ideas about the 
„education of the analyst‟ with the structure and practice of the NPAP during 
the 1950s and 60s I believe I can reasonably infer that Reik could have had 
sufficient reasons for being deeply dissatisfied with his own creation. To this I 
can add that I have always found it extremely surprising to learn that on 
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November 23, 1962, notably during the heyday of the NPAP and the Theodor 
Reik Clinic, Reik agreed to donate fifty photographs in his personal 
collection—a relatively valueless, yet nonetheless important historical 
document—to the New York Psychoanalytic Institute (Pacella, n.d.), thus 
depriving his own institution of a sample of his legacy, and transferring it to 
the organisation who had severely jeopardized his clinical reputation and his 
social status in the United States by refusing to accept him as a full member. 
Would it be too far-fetched to interpret this act as a clear sign of Reik‟s 
profound discontent with the way in which things had developed in the NPAP? 
If it was not an act of institutional revolt or personal disloyalty, would it be too 
far-fetched to interpret it as a symbolic gesture of intellectual detachment from 
his own group of people?   
It is quite unlikely, however, that Reik would have felt more comfortable 
seeing his ideas develop into a proper psychoanalytic tradition within a 
differently structured training organisation. I believe this would not only have 
been the case owing to the formalisation of training that any vocational 
institution favours, but also because of the shared doctrinal allegiance of its 
members which conditions the sustainability of the professional organisation 
as such. Indeed, Reik not only argued that the analyst needs to be endowed 
with moral courage in order to experience the shock of his own unconscious 
thoughts, and use these surprises to the benefit of the analytic process, but 
also that he should develop a strong sense of intellectual independence. As 
he put it in Listening with the Third Ear: “The training of analysts should be 
directed less toward the acquisition of practical and theoretical knowledge 
than the extension of intellectual independence. It is not so much a question 
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of acquiring technical ability as inner truthfulness” (Reik, 1948, p. 493). In May 
1956, Reik extended this precept to the entire domain of psychoanalysis as a 
visionary reflection upon the conditions of its future, yet he somehow failed to 
appreciate the awkward compatibility between the intellectual independence 
of the discipline and that of its members (Reik, 1957). Time and again, it has 
been shown that psychoanalytic organisations do not appreciate intellectual 
independence, or only tolerate small deviations from the accepted internal 
doctrine, the more so as they experience the need to emphasize their 
institutional independence from other disciplines and practices, or from rival 
psychoanalytic organisations. Thus, if Reikian psychoanalysis is 
fundamentally predicated upon the analyst‟s intellectual independence, the 
development of a school or tradition that celebrates this value can only lead to 
an internal contradiction. If the NPAP have consistently refrained from putting 
their training under the aegis of Reikian psychoanalysis—although this may 
have been exactly what Reik intimated during the 1950s and what also 
encouraged him to commit the aforementioned act—it is therefore 
paradoxically a tribute to their spiritual guide, and probably the most Reikian 
decision they could have taken. For if one can only be a true Reikian by being 
radically independent, the implication is that one should also “confess” one‟s 
independence from Reik. One can only be a Reikian by not being a follower, 
which also entails not being a follower of Reik.   
In 1958, the NPAP celebration committee responsible for preparing 
Reik‟s seventieth birthday party pondered the idea of placing the picture of 
their president in the memento above the caption “Fluctuat nec mergitur” (it is 
tossed by the waves, but does not sink) (Nelson, 1958a), the famous device 
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of the City of Paris which Freud had also chosen as an epigraph for his history 
of the psychoanalytic movement (1914/1957). For some reason, Reik‟s 
picture eventually appeared without the motto (Coleman, 1958), yet I believe 
that it would still offer a perfect heading for the contemporary status of Reik‟s 
legacy in the Western world. Constantly confused with Reich, and sometimes 
even crushed between Reich and Reiki, Reik definitely tosses, but he does 
not sink, simply because his “moral courage” and his fierce intellectual 
independence, so laboriously won at the expense of settling his personal 
debts towards his mentor, continue to live on in many professional quarters, 
psychoanalytic and other. There may be no such thing as Reikian 
psychoanalysis, but it is paradoxically by virtue of this absence within the 
psychoanalytic field, and the fact that many professionals are still willing not to 
commit themselves as thinking beings to the authoritative knowledge 
produced and enforced by a psychoanalytic school, that Reik‟s outlook on 
psychoanalysis survives. 
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